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Abstract
As the performance of long-term projects is not observable in the short run politi-
cians may pander to public opinion. To solve this problem, we propose a triple
mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts,
and democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term
performance of a policy, while threshold contracts stipulate a price level on the po-
litical information market that a politician must reach to have the right to stand for
reelection. Reelection thresholds are offered by politicians during campaigns. We
show that, on balance, the triple mechanism increases social welfare.
Keywords: elections, threshold contracts, democracy, information markets, triple
mechanism
JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, D82
¤We would like to thank Jan Boone, J¨ urgen Eichberger, Sylvester Eijfﬁnger, Peter Funk, Volker Hahn,
J¨ org Oechssler, Achim Wambach and seminar participants in Cologne, Heidelberg, Tilburg and Turku for
many helpful comments.1 Introduction
In democracies elections are the primary mechanisms for making politicians accountable.
Holdingreelectionsmayinduceincumbentstoactinthepublicinterestandallowtheelec-
torate to replace an incumbent with a more promising candidate. However, at a particular
election date citizens may sometimes lack the information required to decide wisely about
whether an incumbent deserves to be reelected. Lack of information may arise for several
reasons. Voters may be rationally ignorant, since in a large electorate the likelihood of
a single citizen affecting the outcome of an election is negligible. Alternatively, voters
may have no access to information, e.g. in cases where policies have mainly long-term
effects, and precise information about the consequences of a project is not available at the
election date.
A typical example of a long-term policy is the pressing issue of unemployment. Re-
forming the labor market is generally considered inevitable for remedying unemploy-
ment. However, introducing labor market reforms may initially cause disruptions and
even higher unemployment, because some layoffs will occur immediately, while the cre-
ation of new jobs may take time. Thus in the short term it may be impossible for voters to
judge the politician’s performance in the ﬁeld of labor market policy. A policy problem
with a longer time horizon is global warming, where due to the complex structure of the
global warming problem it is difﬁcult to assess the effect that reducing greenhouse gases
will have on the climate and the well-being of people in the future.1
In this paper we propose a triple mechanism involving political information markets,
threshold incentive contracts, and democratic elections to solve this fundamental infor-
mation problem. At the end of the ﬁrst term, a political information market takes place,
where investors can bet on whether the incumbent will be reelected at the end of the sec-
ond term and hence whether he has undertaken socially beneﬁcial long-term policies. As
it is uncertain whether the politician will be reelected for the ﬁrst time at the end of period
1 this is a conditional information market. It aggregates the information on whether the
1Most predictions suggest that the temperature associated with thermal equilibrium on earth will in-
crease as a result of rapidly rising emissions of greenhouse gases (IPPC (2001)). Such temperature changes
may have a sizable impact on the well-being of future generations (see e.g. Nordhaus (1991), Cline (1992),
and Fankhauser (1995)).incumbent has undertaken socially desirable long-term projects or whether the incumbent
has merely pandered to current public opinion. A high price in the political information
market indicates high probability that the incumbent will be elected a second time.
The second mechanism on which our proposal is built involves reelection threshold
contracts that competing politicians can offer before they start on their ﬁrst term. The
reelection threshold contract stipulates a critical price threshold the information market
must reach or exceed for the incumbent to have the right to stand for ﬁrst reelection. The
critical price thresholds are offered competitively by politicians campaigning for their ﬁrst
term in ofﬁce.
Political information markets, price thresholds on these markets, and democratic
elections increase the motivation of politicians to undertake long-term beneﬁcial poli-
cies that may be unpopular at the time at which they are introduced. This is the main idea
of this paper, and we develop it in the framework of a simple political agency model. We
show that a carefully designed combination of political information markets and threshold
contracts can – on balance – improve welfare.
Our model is most closely related to the proposal for combining contracts and demo-
cratic elections introduced by Gersbach (2003) and extended by Gersbach and Liessem
(2005). A comprehensive presentation of the ideas, chances, and problems of incentive
contracts for politicians can be found in Gersbach (2005). These papers show how the
dual mechanism – contracts offered competitively during campaigns and elections – can
improve political outcomes. All these papers rely on veriﬁable data by which contracts
can be conditioned. By contrast, we analyze in this paper the case where the results from
current policy can only be observed in a future period and may never be veriﬁable. We
propose a novel triple mechanism where a political information market produces veriﬁ-
able information in the form of prices at a time when policy results are not observable.
Political information markets have attracted a lot of attention recently. Information
markets have been proposed to improve public policy decisions (see e.g. the recent sur-
veys and discussions by Hanson (2003), or Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004)). A comprehen-
sive summary on this relatively new topic can be found, for example, in Hahn and Tetlock
(2004). The basic idea behind information markets is the accumulation of scattered in-
3formation in order to predict uncertain future events. Political information markets have
turned out to be very successful in predicting election results (see e.g. Berg, Forsythe and
Rietz (1996) or Berlemann and Schmidt (2001)), and are already established in practice.
We propose a new type of information market. While standard markets predict the result
of the next election, we use a market that predicts the result of the next but one election
in order to obtain an approximation of the long-term effects of the current policies. The
idea is that the incumbent will only be reelected in the next but one election if the voters
are satisﬁed with the long-term project results they learn about over time.
Our paper is broadly related to political agency and accountability theory. While this
literature developed by Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986), and Persson, Roland and Tabellini
(1997) has established the advantages and drawbacks of democratic elections in mak-
ing ofﬁce-holders accountable, we propose new institutional frameworks to improve the
potential of democratic decision-making.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. The
results for elections only are analyzed in section 3. In section 4 we examine the triple
mechanism involving political information markets, threshold incentive contracts, and
democratic elections. In section 5 we look at various extensions to our basic model.
Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs.
2 The Model
Our model draws on Maskin and Tirole (2004), Gersbach (2005) and Gersbach and
Liessem (2005). It contains democratic election rules, information acquisition, an in-
formation market, and reelection threshold contracts. There are three periods, denoted by
t = 1;2;3.
2.1 The Election Framework
We assume that there are two politicians, denoted by i = 1;2. They compete for ofﬁce
before the ﬁrst period starts. The elected politician has to take some kind of action during
the ﬁrst period. He can choose between action a1 = 1 and action a1 = 0. All voters
have the same preference ranking for the two possible actions, but they do not know their
4preferences when they decide about the ofﬁce-holder for the ﬁrst term. There are two
possible states of the world s1 = 1 and s1 = 0, which are drawn randomly. State s1 = 1
will occur with probability z, and state s1 =0 will occur with probability 1¡z. We assume
that 1
2 < z < 1. The state of the world determines which action is optimal for the voters.
If state s1 = 1 is drawn, then the optimal action for the voters will be a1 = 1. The optimal
action for the voters will be a1 = 0 in state s1 = 0. As z > 1
2, we will refer to a1 = 1 as
the popular action and to a1 = 0 as the unpopular action. If a1 = s1 voters get a payoff of
1. Otherwise they get a payoff of 0. Voters are risk-neutral and want to maximize their
expected utility.
There are two types of politicians, either congruent or dissonant. Both politicians
know their own type and the type of their opponent.2 However, voters cannot observe the
politicians’ types. A politician is congruent with probability p (0 < p < 1). In this case
he has the same preferences as the voters. A politician is dissonant with probability 1¡p,
i.e. if a1 = 1 is optimal for the voters, then a1 = 0 is optimal for the dissonant politician
and vice versa. The two political candidates may differ as to congruence or dissonance.
In all other respects they are identical.
2.2 The Information Structure
At the beginning of the whole game, both voters and politicians have a priori probabilities
of z that state s1 = 1 will occur and of 1¡z that state s1 = 0 will occur. In the ﬁrst period,
the elected politician can learn precisely which state of the world will occur, thus knowing
with certainty which action is best for the voters and which action is best for himself.
We assume that while it is impossible to verify which state of the world has occurred
thevoterswillbeabletoobservetherealizedstate. However, itisnotclearwhenthevoters
will make this observation. We assume that before their ﬁrst reelection decision voters
willobservewithprobabilityµwhichstateoftheworldhasoccurred, whiletheprobability
that they will observe the realized state in period 2 (i.e. after their ﬁrst reelection decision)
is 1¡µ. Furthermore, we assume that 0 · µ · 1
2, which means that early observability
2The assumption that politicians have knowledge about each other’s type appears to be plausible because
of their daily interaction. However, a candidate cannot use his knowledge about the type of his opponent in
his election campaign, since he is not able to credibly communicate his information.
5is unlikely. We use this assumption to analyze a situation where the possibility that the
performance of a project is not observable in the short run is a really serious problem.3
Note that regardless of whether there is early observability or not the project result will
never be veriﬁable. Thus the problem of non-veriﬁability is given in all cases.
The value of µ does not depend on the realized state of the world. This means that
early observability is as likely in state s1 = 1 as in state s1 = 0. The incumbent has to
undertake the action in the ﬁrst period before he knows whether the voters will be able to
observe the realized state in period 1.
Some remarks about our informational assumptions are in order here. We model a
situation where politicians obtain information earlier than voters. At the time the policy
is undertaken, the incumbent can precisely identify the correct state of the world, while
voters are still completely ignorant. Voters will observe the state of the world at a later
point in time. If voters only observe the realized state in period 2, they do not know
whether the incumbent has undertaken the socially optimal action at the time of their ﬁrst
reelection decision.
2.3 The Information Market
We allow for a political information market organized during the ﬁrst period and after
politicians have chosen their actions. There are N potential investors.4 Investors are a
subgroup of voters, but they are assumed to be a small group of the electorate so that the
inﬂuence on the voting outcome is negligible. Investors have log utility with
Uj(Yj+Wj) = ln(Yj+Wj) (1)
where Wj is the investor’s wealth and Yj is gain or loss in the information market.5 In-
vestors can obtain a signal regarding the state of the world and can judge about whether
the politician has undertaken the optimal action.6 We use qj to denote the subjective prob-
3The assumption that µ · 1
2 is not crucial for our qualitative results. It is only of importance for our
quantitative welfare analysis in section 4.
4It is sensible, that only individuals should be allowed to trade in such information markets and that
trading volume per person is limited to avoid large-scale manipulation attempts.
5Note that we neglect the utility from the action of the politician in the utility function of the investors
as policy outcomes have no inﬂuence on the trading behavior of the investors.
6One might assume that investors spend time for collecting information concerning the state of the world
and thus have additional knowledge in comparison to ordinary voters.




j to distinguish the subjective probabilities when the politician acts congruently or
dissonantly, i.e. q
g
j denotes the probability that investor j believes that the politician has
chosen the optimal action if a1 = s1, while qb
j denotes the probability in the case a1 6= s1.
Hence, qj 2 fq
g
j;qb




j 8j, i.e. the signals are at least
partially informative regarding the quality of the incumbent’s policy.
With probability µ there is already complete certainty in period 1 regarding the state
of the world. In this case, all investors have the same level of information, and nobody
will make gains or losses in the market. As it is already possible to observe the state of
the world, it is not necessary to run the information market in order to predict the state.
Thus, in the case of early observability we can either assume that the market will take
place or that it will be canceled. As the market has no effect in this case, it will not affect
our analysis.
There are two assets D and E. If the politician gets reelected after the second period
the owners of asset D receive one monetary unit for a single unit of D. If the politician
stands for reelection but is not reelected after the second period the owners of asset E
receive one monetary unit for a single unit of E. This means that the settlement of the
information market will occur at the beginning of period 3, when the result of the second
reelection decision is known. If the politician is not able to run for his second reelec-
tion (for example due to the fact that he was already deselected at the ﬁrst reelection)
or if he does not want to stand for reelection, then all trades that have occurred will be
neutralized.8
The information market works as follows: A bank or an issuer offers an equal amount
of assets D and E. On the secondary market traders can buy assets D or E.9 Trading in the
secondary market results in price p for one unit of asset D. As buying one unit of D and
one unit of E pays one monetary unit with certainty, the price of asset E must be 1¡ p.
Otherwise either traders or the issuer could make riskless proﬁts. An equilibrium in the




j might differ across states, but we ignore this in our analysis.
8Alternatively, it would be possible in this case to make the payoffs of the assets on the information
market dependent on the performance of the politician’s party in the election at the end of period 2.
9We could allow for short-selling, but this is immaterial to our analysis.
7E.10
It is useful to look more closely at the event tree associated with the assets. If, for
example, an investor buys one unit of asset D at price p, then the event tree and the payoffs
for the information market are given as:
Investor receives 1
Investor receives 0












successful at the second
reelection  
Investor buys one unit
of asset D at price p
Investor receives p
Figure 1
In this paper we speciﬁcally design information markets to allow for the design of
reelection threshold contracts introduced in the next subsection.
2.4 Reelection Thresholds
Before the ﬁrst period starts, politician i can offer a threshold contract Ci( ˆ pi), which
means that he will only be allowed to stand for reelection after the ﬁrst period if price
p on the political information market fulﬁlls the condition p ¸ ˆ pi. Candidates compete
by offering Ci( ˆ pi). We will see how competition for threshold contracts impacts on the
policy decisions of the incumbent. If threshold contracts are offered, then the event tree
and the payoffs for the information market have to be modiﬁed in the following way:
10This is equivalent to an information market with only asset D, where traders can buy or sell D, and an
equilibrium is obtained when supply equals demand.
8Investor buys one
unit of asset D at
larger or equal than
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We ﬁrst consider the behavior of both types of politicians in the scenario without thresh-
old contracts and information markets. Here, elections are the only instrument used to
discipline the incumbent.
3.1 Reelection Schemes
We use r1(a1;s1) to denote reelection probability for the incumbent after his ﬁrst period
in ofﬁce.11 Voters are able to observe the realized state in period 1 with probability µ. In
this case they know whether the politician has undertaken the socially optimal action and
will reelect the incumbent if a1 = s1, while they will deselect him if a1 6= s1. If voters
are not able to observe the state of the world in period 1, which happens with probability
1¡µ, they do not know whether the incumbent has acted congruently. In this case voters
will reelect the politician if a1 = 1, while they will deselect him if a1 = 0. The idea
behind the voting behavior in this case is the following: Voters do not know the state of
the world. However, they know that s1 = 1 is more likely than s1 = 0, and thus they will
reelect a politician who has undertaken the popular action a1 =1. Hence, when politicians
undertake their actions, their beliefs regarding reelection are given as
r1(a1 = 1;s1 = 1) = µ+(1¡µ) = 1; (2)
r1(a1 = 0;s1 = 1) = 0; (3)
r1(a1 = 1;s1 = 0) = 1¡µ; (4)
r1(a1 = 0;s1 = 0) = µ: (5)
We assume that reelection probability at the end of period 2 depends only on the
outcomes realized in period 2 from the policy action undertaken in period 1. Further
policy actions during the second term are assumed to be irrelevant for reelection chances
at the end of period 2. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes our analysis and can be justiﬁed
11Note that voters are indifferent between reelection schemes, as the politician will undertake no further
action during his second or third term in ofﬁce. The retrospective voting scheme used in this paper is an
optimal response of voters in our simple model and hence an equilibrium outcome. Retrospective voting
is a particular resolution of the indifference of voters creating the highest possible disciplining device. The
voting behavior can be further justiﬁed as a unique equilibrium outcome when we allow for an arbitrarily
small amount of reciprocity. This justiﬁcation has been developed by Hahn (2004). Of course, retrospective
voting is a polar case, and thus highlights the tradeoffs the politician faces.
10in several ways. First, if the politician undertakes only long-term policies in the second
period, then no new information may be available at the end of the second period when
the second reelection decision takes place. Second, the policy actions during his second
term in ofﬁce may be much less relevant than the ﬁrst-period choices, so the performance
of his policy depends only on his ﬁrst-period action. Later we will extend our model to
cover the case where the incumbent has to undertake further actions and discuss how this
inﬂuences our result.
We use r2(a1;s1ja1 =s1) to denote reelection probability for the incumbent at the end
of period 2 if he has undertaken the action that is optimal for the voters and r2(a1;s1ja1 6=
s1) to denote reelection probability if he has undertaken the wrong action from the voters’
point of view. We assume that voters will reelect the incumbent if and only if he has acted
congruently. Thus, the beliefs of the politicians regarding reelection at the end of period
2 are given as:
r2(a1;s1ja1 = s1) = 1 (6)
and
r2(a1;s1ja1 6= s1) = 0: (7)
3.2 Preferences of Politicians
The elected politician has personal beneﬁts R from being in ofﬁce. Furthermore, he ob-
tains a private beneﬁt or personal satisfaction G if he undertakes the action that is optimal
for himself. This beneﬁt G accrues to the politician in the period in which he performs
the action. We assume that the candidate receives no utility from the realization of his
preferred action if another politician undertakes the action.12 We use d with 0 < d · 1 to
denote the discount factor for the politician. We will use the following tie-breaking rule:
If the elected politician is indifferent as to the two actions, he will undertake the action
that is optimal for the voters.
12We might also assume that the politician receives the same utility as an ordinary voter if his opponent
performs the action. However, this assumption may be less plausible in the case of a dissonant politician.
At all events, the results of our analysis are not affected, as long as the value of G is sufﬁciently large in
comparison to the utility of ordinary voters.
11There are eight different cases depending on which state has occurred, which type of
politician is involved, and which action he is undertaking. We use the following notation:
Thesuperscriptintheutilityfunctiondenotesthetypeofthepolitician, whilethesubscript
in the utility function denotes his behavior. An elected politician who is congruent has
utility
UcP
c = R+G+r1(a1;s1ja1 = s1) [dR+r2(a1;s1ja1 = s1) d2R] (8)
if he undertakes the optimal action in the ﬁrst period. Note that reelection probability
r1(a1;s1ja1 = s1) for a politician who behaves congruently depends on the state of the
world. If s1 = 1 has occurred he will be reelected with certainty, while his reelection
chance will be equal to µ if s1 = 0 has occurred. The notation r1(a1;s1ja1 = s1) covers
both cases. An elected politician of the congruent type has utility
UcP
d = R+r1(a1;s1ja1 6= s1) [dR+r2(a1;s1ja1 6= s1) d2R] (9)
if he behaves dissonantly in the ﬁrst period. A dissonant politician has utility
UdP
c = R+r1(a1;s1ja1 = s1) [dR+r2(a1;s1ja1 = s1) d2R] (10)
if he undertakes the socially optimal action in the ﬁrst period, while his utility is
UdP
d = R+G+r1(a1;s1ja1 6= s1) [dR+r2(a1;s1ja1 6= s1) d2R] (11)
if he behaves dissonantly in the ﬁrst period. Note that because of r2(a1;s1ja1 6= s1) = 0
both types of politicians are deselected with certainty after the second period at the latest
if they behaved dissonantly in the ﬁrst period. By contrast, as r2(a1;s1ja1 = s1) = 1 both
types of politicians are reelected with certainty at the end of the second period13 if they
behaved congruently in the ﬁrst period. We now need to examine the circumstances under
which the elected politician will act congruently. Obviously, it is always optimal for the
voters if the incumbent behaves congruently.14
13Note that it is possible that a politician who behaved congruently in his ﬁrst term may be dropped from
ofﬁce by the voters at their ﬁrst reelection decision.
14Note that, in contrast to Maskin and Tirole (2004), there is no “selection effect“ in our model, as the
politician only acts during his ﬁrst term in ofﬁce. Thus there is no welfare-enhancing effect when the voters
discover that the incumbent is of the dissonant type and accordingly select a new one.
123.3 Behavior of Dissonant Politicians
We ﬁrst look at the case s1 = 1, where the popular action is optimal from the voters’ point
of view but the politician would prefer the unpopular action. The dissonant politician will
only undertake the correct action if
R+dR+d2R ¸ R+G
, dR(1+d) ¸ G: (12)
Condition (12) will be violated if personal gain from choosing the optimal action for
himself is sufﬁciently larger than the gains from holding ofﬁce.
Wenextexamines1 =0, wherevotersprefer theunpopularactionwhile thepolitician
prefers the popular action. The dissonant politician will only undertake the optimal action
if
R+µ(dR+d2R) ¸ R+G+(1¡µ)dR
, dR(2µ+dµ¡1) ¸ G: (13)
Thiscondition can only be fulﬁlled forcertain valuesof d and µ, as(13) cannot be satisﬁed
if (2µ+dµ¡1) is not positive. Note that (2µ+dµ¡1) is monotonically increasing in d.
For d = 1 the condition (2µ+dµ¡1) > 0 is equivalent to µ > 1
3. This means that even in
thecaseofd=1(thebestvaluetofulﬁllthecondition)itisonlypossibletofulﬁllequation
(13) for 1
3 < µ < 1
2. Hence there are large parameter ranges where it is not possible to
motivate a dissonant politician to perform the optimal action if the unpopular state has
occurred. In particular, this will not be possible if the probability of early observation
by the voters is small, as reﬂected in a low value for µ. Furthermore, it is obvious that
condition (12) is easier to fulﬁll than condition (13).
Finally, we obtain the following intuitive results. If the parameters are such that con-
dition (12) is fulﬁlled while condition (13) is not fulﬁlled, then there will be a distortion
in favor of the popular action a1 = 1. If neither condition (12) nor condition (13) are ful-
ﬁlled, then there will be a distortion in favor of the unpopular action a1 = 0.15 It is useful
to summarize the key observations in the following proposition.
15Note that z > 1
2, so – under the assumption that neither (12) nor (13) are fulﬁlled – the probability
that the incumbent will undertake a1 = 0 in a situation where he should perform a1 = 1 is higher than the
probability for undertaking a1 = 1 instead of the optimal action a1 = 0.
13Proposition 1
Dissonant politicians will not choose the optimal action
(i) if s1 = 1 and dR(1+d) < G or
(ii) if s1 = 0 and dR(2µ+dµ¡1) < G.
Four particularly interesting special cases of Proposition 1 are summarized in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1
Suppose d = 1. A dissonant politician will not choose the optimal action,
a) if s1 = 1 has occurred and G > 2R or
b) if s1 = 0 has occurred and G > 1
2R or
g) if s1 = 0 has occurred and µ < 1
3 or
d) if s1 = 0 has occurred and d <
1¡2µ
µ .
Note that d = 1 is most favorable for the public. If it is not possible to motivate a
dissonant incumbent to act congruently in the case d = 1, then it will never be possible.
3.4 Behavior of Congruent Politicians
The congruent politician will undertake the optimal action in state s1 = 1 if
R+G+dR+d2R ¸ R: (14)
This condition is always fulﬁlled, which means that in this state of the world congruent
politicians always undertake the optimal action as both voters and the politician prefer the
popular action.
We now look at the case s1 =0, meaning that both the voters and the politician prefer
the unpopular action. The congruent politician will only undertake the optimal action if
R+G+µ(dR+d2R) ¸ R+(1¡µ)dR
, G+dR(2µ+dµ¡1) ¸ 0: (15)
14In contrast to the case of s1 = 1 it may now be the case that even a congruent politician
will not undertake the optimal policy although he too would prefer this optimal action,
since the optimal action is unpopular but the politician would like to be reelected. This
condition resembles equation (13) from above, but now G is on the left side because a
congruent politician receives personal beneﬁts G by acting congruently, while a dissonant
politician receives G by acting dissonantly. Hence, if condition (13) is fulﬁlled, then con-
dition (15) will also hold. Obviously, if it is possible to motivate a dissonant politician to
undertake the optimal action, then it is always possible to motivate a congruent politician
to undertake the optimal action. Clearly, the reverse is not true. Furthermore, we have a
distortion in favor of the popular action given that it is possible for a1 = 1 to be chosen
too often, while the incumbent might not always carry out the unpopular action a1 = 0
when he should. We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2
A politician of the congruent type will not undertake the socially optimal action if s1 = 0
and G+dR(2µ+dµ¡1) < 0.
4 The Triple Mechanism
We now analyze the effects of reelection threshold contracts on the behavior of the politi-
cians. A reelection threshold contract Ci( ˆ pi) (with ˆ pi > 0) consists of an announcement
by politician i about the price p that will at least be reached on the information market.
The threshold contract has the following consequence: If politician i offers Ci( ˆ pi), then
he will only be allowed to stand for reelection after the ﬁrst period if the price p on the
information market fulﬁlls the condition p ¸ ˆ pi. There will be competition concerning
the threshold contracts.
The following questions will be of interest: Does price p on the information market
correctly predict the quality of the politician’s action? Will politicians offer reelection
threshold contracts if this is voluntary? Is it possible to motivate politicians to behave
optimally by introducing threshold contracts?
154.1 Reelection Schemes
If information markets are allowed and actually used, they might be taken into account by
voters when making reelection decisions. Such feedback effects will be discussed in our
extensions. In this section we abstract from such feedback effects in order to identify the
pure effect of reelection contracts.
When there is no feedback from information markets to voting, reelection decisions
by voters are the same as when no such markets and threshold contracts are present. Thus
we still have the reelection probabilities from the section above. Note that the scheme
for the ﬁrst reelection is such that a politician will always be deselected if he acts dis-
sonantly in the state s1 = 1. Thus threshold contracts will have no effect in the state
s1 = 1, as the reelection scheme with r1(a1 = 1;s1 = 1) = 1 and r1(a1 = 0;s1 = 1) = 0 is
already the maximal possible spread for deterring the politician from acting dissonantly.
Adding threshold contracts forbidding a politician who has behaved dissonantly to run for
reelection will not change the results, as the politician would not get reelected anyway.
Nevertheless, threshold contracts will have a positive effect in the state s1 = 0, where the
reelection chances of a politician who has chosen the dissonant action will decrease from
1¡µ to 0.
4.2 Pricing on the Information Market
In the next stage we determine the equilibrium price in the information market. We as-
sume that all investors acquire a signal.
Suppose that the incumbent, say politician i, has offered a threshold contract Ci( ˆ pi).
Hence, for a price p< ˆ pi no investor will have a strict incentive to buy assets as he will be
paid back p. Suppose p ¸ ˆ pi. An investor j who has obtained signal qj has to weigh up
the state of his information and the information the market price will reveal. A standard
way to model the information aggregation process is as follows:
Prob(REjp) = bj Prob(RE)+(1¡bj) p (16)
where bj (with 0 · bj · 1) is a weighting term describing self-assessed conﬁdence, i.e.
the subjective conﬁdence of an investor in his own signal qj relative to the market signal
16expressed by price p.16
Given price p and signal qj, an investor j maximizes
max
dj
EUj = Prob(REjp) ln(Wj+dj(1¡ p))+(1¡Prob(REjp)) ln(Wj¡djp) (17)
where dj is the demand. If dj is positive, investor j wants to buy dj units of asset D. If























Proof of Proposition 3








Wj bj qj ¡ p
N P
j=1
Wj bj = 0 and the assertion follows from that.
The market price is a wealth- and conﬁdence-weighted average belief on the part of
investors. We note that the market price is equal to the simple average belief of investors
if traders are homogeneous with respect to wealth and conﬁdence in their own signal. If
conﬁdence levels are homogeneous, the market price is a wealth-weighted average belief
on the part of traders. We summarize both cases in the following corollary:
Corollary 2





16For a statistical foundation see Morris (1983) and Rosenblueth and Ordaz (1992).









There are two equilibrium price realizations, depending on whether or not the politi-
cian has undertaken the socially desirable policy. We use p¤
u to denote the upper equilib-
rium price in the case a1 = s1 and p¤
l to denote the lower equilibrium price in the case






























Politicians are free to offer threshold contracts. We assume that both politicians have to
decide simultaneously about offering a threshold contract. As voters can only observe the
threshold contracts of candidates and not their type, they are in expected terms equally or
better off when they elect the candidate who offers a tighter constraint on his reelection
threshold, as long as politicians can secure reelection by undertaking the socially optimal
policy. Hence we obtain the following result, where e1( ˆ p1; ˆ p2) denotes the probability
that candidate 1 will be elected at the ﬁrst election decision:
Proposition 4
The sophisticated election scheme (SES)





u ¸ ˆ p1 > ˆ p2 or if ˆ p2 > p¤
u and ˆ p1 · p¤
u,
1
2 if ˆ p1 = ˆ p2, or if ˆ p1 > p¤
u and ˆ p2 > p¤
u,
0 if ˆ p1 < ˆ p2 · p¤
u or if ˆ p1 > p¤
u and ˆ p2 · p¤
u.
is optimal for voters.18
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. While we will work for the
moment with the sophisticated election scheme from Proposition 4, we will comment in
section 5 on other optimal and simpler election schemes. All these schemes will produce
the same welfare results.
17Note that the offer of a threshold contract with ˆ pi < p¤
l is equivalent to offering no contract at all, since
it is not possible for the price on the information market to be smaller than p¤
l .
18One could reﬁne SES by adding e1( ˆ p1; ˆ p2) = 1
2 if ˆ p1 < p¤
l and ˆ p2 < p¤
l . This is immaterial to our
analysis.
18It is important to note that the point in time when threshold contracts can be offered
is at the beginning of the game, that is, even before the politicians have learned which
state of the world has occurred. The politicians only know the probabilities of the two
states. We thus obtain
Proposition 5
Both politicians will offer incentive contracts Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
u) irrespective of their own type
and irrespective of the type of their opponent.
The proof is given in the appendix. The next proposition is our main result.
Proposition 6
The conditions under which politicians in state s1 = 0 behave congruently with threshold
contracts are less strict, and dissonant behavior is less attractive, than without thresholds.
This holds for both types of politicians. In the scenario with the triple mechanism we
obtain:
(i) A dissonant politician behaves congruently in s1 = 1 if dR(1+d) ¸ G.
(ii) A dissonant politician behaves congruently in s1 = 0 if dRµ(1+d) ¸ G.
(iii) A congruent politician always behaves congruently in both states.
The proof is given in the appendix. The intuition is as follows: Given equilibrium
threshold contracts Ci(p¤
u), politicians who behave dissonantly in the state s1 = 0 have
no chance of being reelected. If they behave congruently, their reelection chances are
given by the probability µ. If no threshold contracts are written, a politician who behaves
dissonantly still has a chance to get reelected, while congruent behavior does not yield
higher reelection probabilities than µ. Hence threshold contracts contingent on prices in
the political information market make dissonant behavior in the state s1 =0 less attractive
relative to congruent behavior.
4.4 Welfare Gains
In this section we provide a brief example of the welfare gains that can be achieved with
the triple mechanism. Suppose that, at a time when this institution is introduced, it is only
19known that d is equal to 1 and that µ is uniformly distributed in [0; 1
2]. Since only the
proportion of R and G is important for our analysis, we write G = aR with 0 · a < ¥.
In the following we calculate the values of µ that enable congruent behavior by the in-
cumbent. We use eo to denote the case with elections only and tm to denote the scenario
with the triple mechanism. From condition (14) we obtain the conclusion that in the case
of elections only a congruent politician will only behave congruently in state s1 = 1 if
aR+3R ¸ R:
This condition is always fulﬁlled. In the same way, we obtain the other conditions that
are summarized in the following table:
Congruent Politician Dissonant Politician
s1 = 1 s1 = 0 s1 = 1 s1 = 0
Elections Only a ¸ ¡2 µ ¸
1¡a
3
a · 2 µ ¸
1+a
3
Triple Mechanism a ¸ ¡2 µ ¸ ¡
a
2




Note that congruent politicians always behave congruently in the scenario with the
triplemechanism, astheconditionsa¸¡2andµ¸¡a
2 arealwaysfulﬁlled. Furthermore,
congruent politicians always behave congruently in the scenario with elections only if
a ¸ 1. Finally, it can be seen that a dissonant politician will never act congruently for
a ¸ 2, which clearly derives from Corollary 1 and Proposition 6. In the next stage we
calculate the expected utilities
EUtm = p+(1¡p)z
8
> > > > > <









2dµ if a > 2
+(1¡p)(1¡z)
8
> > > > > <
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2dµ if a > 1
+(1¡p)z
8
> > > > > <









2dµ if a > 2
+(1¡p)(1¡z)
8
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2dµ if a > 1
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p+(1¡p)[1¡a(1¡z)] if a · 1
p+(1¡p)z if 1 < a · 2
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2 < a · 1
p+(1¡p)z if 1 < a · 2
p if a > 2
(21)
We illustrate the relationships by calculating the utilities for four different values
of a. We choose one value of a that is smaller than 1, one value larger than 1, and a
equal to 1. These values correspond to the cases where for the politician the utility G is
lower/higher than or equal to the utility R. Furthermore, we add the special case a = 0,
where the politician has no private beneﬁts G. The expected utilities in these four cases
are summarized in the following table:























Note that in all cases we have EUtm ¸ EUeo. Furthermore, we see that EUtm is strictly
larger than EUeo if z < 1 and a < 1. The difference between EUtm and EUeo depends on
p and z for 0 < a < 1. The last row of the table shows the relative welfare gains (DEU).
DEU is maximum for a = 0. The example illustrates the following insights:
(i) Threshold contracts have the highest effect in the case a = 0, i.e. if the politicians
are only motivated by beneﬁts R acquired from holding ofﬁce.
(ii) If a is at least equal to 1, i.e. if politicians are at least as motivated by G as by R,
thenthereisnoeffectfromthresholdcontracts. Thisisduetothefactthatcongruent
politicians always behave congruently, while dissonant candidates always behave
dissonantly in state s1 = 0. The conditions for congruent behavior in state s1 = 1
are the same in the scenarios with or without threshold contracts.
If a is at least equal to 2, then congruent politicians always behave congruently,
while dissonant candidates always behave dissonantly. Thus the expected utility is
equal to p.
(iii) Finally, for a given value of a we discover that DEU is (weakly) increasing when
p decreases. Thus the more politicians are dissonant, the greater is the effect of
threshold contracts.
225 Extensions
In the following we extend our basic scenario in various directions. First, we consider
otherelectionschemesandexploretheirrobustness. Second, weexaminefeedbackeffects
when voters take the price on the information market into consideration for their ﬁrst
reelection decision. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case of more than two periods,
where the incumbent has to undertake an action during each period. The three extensions
are discussed independently of each other, which means that we start with our basic model
and then introduce one particular modiﬁcation.
5.1 Other Election Schemes and Overpromising
The sophisticated election scheme used in our basic version of the model requires com-
mon knowledge concerning the values qj, Wj and bj for voters to be able to calculate
the value p¤
u before the ﬁrst election takes place. One may ask whether other election
schemes might produce the same equilibrium threshold contracts. We ﬁrst consider a
simple scheme called monotonic election scheme (MES):




1 if ˆ p1 > ˆ p2,
1
2 if ˆ p1 = ˆ p2,
0 if ˆ p1 < ˆ p2.
Such a scheme, however, might invite extreme short-termism in the following sense:
Given for example ˆ p1 = p¤
u, candidate 2 could select a threshold ˆ p2 > p¤
u in order to be
elected with certainty. Although the second politician will never be reelected, this may
be proﬁtable compared to an election chance of 1
2. The question whether MES invites
extreme short-termism is covered by the following proposition:
Proposition 7
Case (i): Suppose that voters use MES and that both politicians are of the congruent type.
(a) The scheme MES is optimal (and leads to Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
u)) if
Rf[z+µ(1¡z)](d+d2)¡1g ¸ G (22)
is fulﬁlled. Then both politicians will offerCi( ˆ pi = p¤
u) and have election probabil-
ities of 1
2. The elected politician will act congruently in both states of the world.
23(b) If condition (22) is not fulﬁlled, then both politicians will offer Ci( ˆ pi = 1), they
have election probabilities of 1
2, and the elected politician will act congruently in
both states.
Case (ii): Suppose that voters use MES and that both politicians are of the dissonant type.
(a) The scheme MES is optimal (and leads to Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
u)) if either the condition
1
2




[z(d+d2)¡1] ¸ G: (24)
is fulﬁlled. Then both politicians will offerCi( ˆ pi = p¤
u) and have election probabil-
ities of 1
2. The elected politician will act congruently in the state s1 = 1. In the state
s1 = 0 he will only act congruently if dRµ(1+d) ¸ G.
(b) If neither condition (23) nor condition (24) is fulﬁlled, then both politicians will
offer Ci( ˆ pi = 1), they have election probabilities of 1
2, and the elected politician
will act dissonantly in both states.
Case (iii): Suppose that voters use MES and that one politician (without loss of generality
candidate 1) is of the congruent type, while his opponent is of the dissonant type.
(a) The scheme MES is optimal (and leads to Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
u)) if either (23) or (24) is
fulﬁlled. Then both politicians will offerCi( ˆ pi = p¤
u) and have election probabilities
of 1
2. The elected politician will act congruently in the state s1 = 1. If candidate
1 is elected, he will also behave congruently in the state s1 = 0. If candidate 2 is
elected, he will only act congruently in the state s1 = 0 if dRµ(1+d) ¸ G.
(b) If neither condition (23) nor condition (24) is fulﬁlled, then both politicians will
offer Ci( ˆ pi = 1) and have election probabilities of 1
2. If candidate 1 is elected, he
will behave congruently. If candidate 2 is elected, he will behave dissonantly.
The proof is given in the appendix. Note that if condition (23) is not fulﬁlled, then
dissonant politicians will promise a higher reelection probability than they can actually
24achieve. This behavior can be interpreted as overpromising. Overpromising invites ex-
treme short-termism, where dissonant politicians behave dissonantly in all cases. While
it is obvious that overpromising is detrimental in the case of dissonant politicians, the
negative effect of overpromising is more difﬁcult to detect when the incumbent is of the
congruent type. A congruent politician will behave congruently even if he overpromises.
Thus his ﬁrst-period behavior is not inﬂuenced in a negative way by overpromising. How-
ever, a politician who has practiced overpromising is never allowed to run for reelection.
Hence a congruent incumbent has to be replaced by a new politician who can be either
congruent or dissonant. Since a congruent politician creates higher expected welfare than
a dissonant candidate, overpromising may have a negative dynamic feedback effect in
the case of a congruent incumbent. Note that this argument is only relevant under the
assumption that there might be another action of the politicians in period 2 or 3, while
under the assumptions of our basic model the type of the incumbent in period 2 and 3
does not matter at all, as he will undertake no further action.
Now we examine another voting scheme called robust election scheme (RES):
e1( ˆ p1; ˆ p2) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if ˆ p1 ¸ 1
2 and ˆ p2 < 1
2,
1
2 if ˆ p1 ¸ 1
2 and ˆ p2 ¸ 1
2,
1
2 if ˆ p1 < 1
2 and ˆ p2 < 1
2,
0 if ˆ p1 < 1
2 and ˆ p2 ¸ 1
2.
The idea of this voting scheme is the following: Voters will elect a politician if he
announces that he will undertake the optimal policy, which is reﬂected in a value ˆ p ¸ 1
2,
whereas the absolute value of ˆ p does not matter. As p¤
u ¸ 1
2 there is no overpromising
problem in this case. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 8
The robust election scheme is optimal for voters. Both politicians will offer threshold
contracts Ci( ˆ pi = 1
2).
The proof of Proposition 8 is given in the appendix. The RES greatly enhances the
applicability of our triple mechanism. Under this scheme voters do not need to have
speciﬁc information regarding the parameters of projects or the wealth and the signals of
investors in the information market. They simply judge whether politicians are willing to
25compete against a fair coin when they hold ofﬁce.
5.2 Forward-Looking Voters and Political Information Markets
In our basic model we have assumed that price p on the information market has no in-
ﬂuence on reelection probability r1(a1). In this subsection we assume that the voters pay
attention to the price on the information market at the stage when they have to decide
about the ﬁrst reelection of the incumbent. Imagine an extreme case where voters only
use the price on the information market as a basis for their reelection decision. As price
p will be p = p¤
u for a1 = s1 and p = p¤
l for a1 6= s1, the following scheme is optimal:
r1(p(a1;s1)) =
(
1 if p ¸ p¤
u,
0 if p < p¤
u.
Note that reelection probability no longer depends directly on the action undertaken
but only on price p which measures the quality of the politician’s action. We start by
looking at the scenario without threshold contracts. In this case, a dissonant politician
will undertake the optimal action if
R+(dR+d2R) ¸ R+G
, dR(1+d) ¸ G (25)
In the next stage we look at the scenario where politicians are allowed to offer threshold
contracts and obtain exactly the same condition as in equation (25). Hence in this case
threshold contracts are without effect (either positive or negative). The existence of a
political information market that predicts the reelection chances after the next term is
sufﬁcient to generate all efﬁciency gains when voters use this forward-looking reelection
scheme.
This result is due to the fact that the reelection scheme of the voters reproduces the
consequences of equilibrium reelection contracts. If the incumbent undertakes an action
that would result in his deselection after the second term, then he is already rejected after
his ﬁrst term in ofﬁce. This reelection scheme is indeed optimal for the voters. The in-
cumbent has no opportunity to behave in a populistic manner. Obviously, the case where
voters fully adopt the assessments from the information market is less plausible, and only
26the combination of reelection threshold contracts, information markets, and elections ac-
tually promises to produce all possible welfare gains.
5.3 Repeated Actions by the Politician
So far we have restricted the game to three periods. In the following we analyze the
case where the incumbent is allowed to stay in ofﬁce as long as he gets reelected. The
incumbenthas toundertakeanaction at ineachperiodt (t =1;:::;T ¡2)inofﬁce, withthe
exception of the last two periods.19 T denotes the last term in ofﬁce of the incumbent and
hence his maximum lifetime as a potentially active politician. The candidates are allowed
to offer threshold contracts before each election. The functioning of these contracts is the
same as in the basic model, where threshold contracts were offered only once. All the
assumptions of our basic model concerning the actions, the reelection probability after
the ﬁrst period etc. are still valid, as the policy problem in t = 1 is repeated T ¡2 times.
In particular, we have r1(a1 = 1;s1 = 1) = 1, r1(a1 = 0;s1 = 1) = 0, r1(a1 = 1;s1 =
0) = 1¡µ, and r1(a1 = 0;s1 = 0) = µ. A new component in our model is the reelection
probability at the end of each periodt witht >1. There are two possible extreme cases for
the reelection scheme. First suppose that voters take only the last action of the politician
into consideration. In this case, reelection probabilities, denoted by rP
t , are given as
rP
t (at;stjat = 1;st = 1) = 1 ; (26)
rP
t (at;stjat = 0;st = 1) = 0 ; (27)
rP
t (at;stjat = 1;st = 0) = 1¡µ ; (28)
rP
t (at;stjat = 0;st = 0) = µ : (29)
This reelection scheme captures popularity voting, i.e. cases where voting is de-
termined by the current attraction of a politician’s action. Second, imagine a reelection
scheme that only takes into consideration the action of the politician in period t ¡1 (i.e.
voters behave retrospectively), denoted by rR
t , and given by
rR
t (at¡1;st¡1jat¡1 = st¡1) = 1 (30)
19The assumption that the politician undertakes no action during the last two periods is equivalent to our
assumption in the basic model that the politician chooses no action in the second and third period.
27and
rR
t (at¡1;st¡1jat¡1 6= st¡1) = 0: (31)
Note that this retrospective reelection scheme is equivalent to the one used in our ba-
sic scenario to calculate the reelection probability at the end of the second period, while
the popularity reelection scheme is equivalent to the one used to calculate reelection prob-
ability at the end of the ﬁrst period.




(i) Suppose voters behave retrospectively in all periods t with t > 1. Then the condi-
tions under which politicians behave congruently with threshold contracts are less
strict, and dissonant behavior is less attractive, than without thresholds. This holds
for both types of politicians and for both states.
(ii) Suppose voters behave according to the popularity reelection scheme in all periods
t with t > 1. Then the conditions under which politicians behave congruently with
threshold contracts are less strict, and dissonant behavior is less attractive, than
without thresholds. This holds for both types of politicians and for both states.
The proof is given in the appendix. Under both analyzed reelection schemes, a con-
gruent politician will always behave optimally if threshold contracts and information mar-
kets are introduced, while it is possible that he will undertake the socially undesirable
action in the scenario without threshold contracts. Note that under retrospective voting
a politician will be deselected if he acts dissonantly, while a politician who always acts
congruently will deﬁnitely not be deselected for all periods t > 1. This contrasts with
the popularity voting scheme, where it is possible that even a politician who always acts
congruently will be deselected. If the politician is of the dissonant type, then it is possible
that he will act dissonantly even in the scenario with threshold contracts. Nevertheless, the
conditions under which dissonant politicians behave congruently with threshold contracts
are less strict than without thresholds.
28The extension of our model to T periods shows that the results of the two-period
case are still valid. The scenario with the combination of elections and threshold incentive
contracts is always socially advantageous compared to the case with elections alone, since
the probability of a politician behaving congruently is higher when threshold contracts
exist.20
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a triple mechanism to improve the functioning of democ-
racies when information is not observable or not veriﬁable. The results seem to be quite
robust under various extensions. Moreover, the idea of the triple mechanism might be ex-
tended to multi-task settings where the politician decides on many issues in his ﬁrst term.
As the threshold contract depends on the average long-term performance of the politician,
the standard problem may aggravate distortions in favor of tasks with better observability.
Political information markets are an instrument for solving the problem of short-
term unobservability coupled with long-term non-veriﬁability. Hence threshold contracts
combined with information markets can be used successfully when projects have long-
term effects and information on project results is not available in the short term. Of
course, any proposal for a new institution such as the one we have made in this paper,
has to be subjected to further scrutiny.21 Such scrutiny will be undertaken in our future
research work.
20Note that, in contrast to our basic version of the model, there might now exist a welfare-enhancing
“selection effect“, as there are repeated actions. Nevertheless, the triple mechanism is still advantageous.
Suppose that there is a dissonant incumbent and the parameters are such that he would act congruently
and be reelected under the triple mechanism, while he would act dissonantly and be deselected in the case
with elections only. Then he will either always act congruently under the triple mechanism, or he will
act dissonantly and be deselected in a later period. In both cases, the beneﬁts are higher under the triple
mechanism, as there is either no dissonant behavior at all, or the dissonant behavior takes place in the more
distant future. In the other case, where the incumbent is of the congruent type, the lower probability of
being deselected under the triple mechanism is advantageous at all events.
21One might, for example, wonder how the triple mechanism can be introduced. We think that this might
be triggered in election campaigns. If one party proposes the idea then competing parties might be forced
to offer the same in order to avoid a decline of supporting votes.
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Proof of Proposition 4
Note that a politician offering a contract with a price higher than p¤
u will deﬁnitely not be
allowed to stand for reelection and thus will behave in full accordance with his ﬁrst-period
preferences. Hence such a politician can never achieve a higher utility than a politician
offering a price equal to or smaller than p¤
u. The same argument holds for a politician, say
i = 2, who offers ˆ p2 with ˆ p2 < ˆ p1 · p¤
u. In this case electing politician 1 can never be
worse than electing politician 2.
Proof of Proposition 5
Note that both candidates decide simultaneously about their threshold contracts. Hence
they do not know the proposal of their opponent when they have to offer their contracts.
Wewantto showthatthe offerCi( ˆ pi = p¤
u)for i=1;2isa uniqueNash equilibrium. Given
that ˆ p2 = p¤
u, politician 1 will deﬁnitely not be elected if he does not offer ˆ p1 = p¤
u. Thus
offeringCi( ˆ pi = p¤
u) is a Nash equilibrium. In the next stage we show that it is unique.
We start by considering a politician (without loss of generalization candidate 1) who
is of the congruent type and show that Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
l ) for i = 1;2 is not a Nash equilibrium.
Given that ˆ p2 = p¤
l , politician 1 has the following choices: He can offer a threshold
contract with p¤
u ¸ ˆ p1 > p¤
l , then he will deﬁnitely be elected. If he offers the contract
C1( ˆ p1 = p¤
l ) instead, then his election probability is 1
2. Since the politicians are not yet
conversant with the state of the world when they have to decide about offering a threshold
contract, they have to base their utility comparison on the expected utility EU. State
s1 = 1 will occur with probability z, while s1 = 0 will occur with probability 1¡z. Hence
the necessary condition for a congruent politician 1 to offer a threshold contract with
p¤
u ¸ ˆ p1 > p¤
l in the case of ˆ p2 = p¤













If a congruent politician offers a threshold incentive contract with p¤
u ¸ ˆ p1 > p¤
l and
gets elected, then he will always behave congruently.22 If a congruent politician offers a
contract ˆ p1 = p¤
l and gets elected, then his behavior in state s1 =0 will depend on whether










22This is obvious in state s1 = 1. In state s1 = 0, the politician has utility R+G+µ[dR+d2R] when he
behaves congruently and utility R when be behaves dissonantly. Hence the politician will always behave
congruently.
30To analyze this inequality, we consider the two possible cases starting with R+G+
µ[dR+d2R] ¸ (R+(1¡µ)dR). In this case, inequality (33) can be simpliﬁed to 1 ¸ 1
2,
which is always fulﬁlled. Next we look at R+G+µ[dR+d2R] < (R+(1¡µ)dR). This




















ˆ p1j ˆ p1 = p¤
l
´
. According to this consideration of expected utilities,
politician 1 will offer a contract with p¤
u ¸ ˆ p1 > p¤
l . Thus Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
l ) is not a Nash
equilibrium. The same argument holds for all contracts with ˆ pi < p¤
u, as the politicians
will always overbid themselves up to ˆ pi = p¤
u. There remains the question about offers
ˆ pi > p¤
u. Given that politician 2 offers ˆ p2 > p¤
u, it is optimal for candidate 1 to deviate to
ˆ p1 = p¤
u. We can summarize the above considerations as follows: If a politician is of the
congruent type, he will always offer an incentive contract Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
u), irrespective of his
opponent’s behavior.
In the next step we analyze the behavior of a politician (without loss of generalization
candidate 1) who is of the dissonant type and look at the case where his opponent offers
ˆ p2 = p¤
l . In contrast to our considerations above for congruent politicians, it is no longer
clear this time whether politician 1 will behave congruently or dissonantly. Nevertheless,
we can still predict that he will offer a contract C1( ˆ p1 = p¤
u). This can be done in the
following way: If the value of G is large enough, then a dissonant politician will behave
in a dissonant manner regardless of the threshold contract he has offered. Given that
ˆ p2 = p¤





u ¸ ˆ p1 > p¤
l
´



















Inthiscase where thepolitician alwaysbehavesdissonantly, itis obviousthat the expected
utility is larger if the politician offers ˆ p1 > p¤
l . Since a threshold contract with ˆ p1 = p¤
u
is as easy to fulﬁll as a contract with p¤
u > ˆ p1 > p¤
l , it will be optimal for candidate 1 to
offer ˆ p1 = p¤
u.
For certain parameter ranges the politician acts congruently regardless of the thresh-
31old contract he has offered. Given that ˆ p2 = p¤

























In the case of a politician who always acts congruently, it is obvious that the expected
utility is larger if the politician offers ˆ p1 > p¤
l . In line with the argumentation set out
above, it will be optimal for candidate 1 to offer ˆ p1 = p¤
u.
There remains the scenario where the politician behaves congruently in one case and
dissonantly in the other. It will never be the case that the politician acts congruently
after offering ˆ p1 < p¤
u while acting dissonantly after offering ˆ p1 = p¤
u. Hence the only
case left to check is the scenario where the politician behaves dissonantly with contract
C1( ˆ p1 < p¤
u) and congruently with contract C1( ˆ p1 = p¤
u). We know the following: If the
politician has offered the contractC1( ˆ p1 = p¤
u), he will only act congruently if his utility is
largerthanitwouldbebyactingdissonantly. Furthermore, theutilityofactingdissonantly
with contract C1( ˆ p1 < p¤
u) is smaller than the utility of acting dissonantly with contract
C1( ˆ p1 = p¤
u). Thus it is clear that the utility of acting dissonantly withC1( ˆ p1 < p¤
u) has to
be smaller than the utility of behaving congruently with contract C1( ˆ p1 = p¤
u).
Thus Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
l ) is not a Nash equilibrium. The same argument holds for all con-
tracts with ˆ pi < p¤
u, as the politicians will always overbid themselves up to ˆ pi = p¤
u. Fur-
thermore, contracts with ˆ pi > p¤
u are not Nash equilibria because if politician 2 offers
ˆ p2 > p¤
u, it is optimal for candidate 1 to deviate to ˆ p1 = p¤
u. Therefore we obtain the
following result: If a politician is of the dissonant type, he will always offer an incentive
contractCi( ˆ pi = p¤
u), irrespective of his opponent’s behavior.
Thus the offer Ci( ˆ pi = p¤
u) for i = 1;2 is a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6
We start with dissonant politicians. We look ﬁrst at the case s1 = 1. Here the state of
the world is such that the popular action is optimal from the voters’ point of view, but the
32politician would prefer the unpopular action. In the scenario with threshold contracts, the
dissonant politician will undertake the right action if
R+dR+d2R ¸ R+G
, dR(1+d) ¸ G: (38)
Comparison with the condition in the scenario without threshold contracts shows that
condition (38) is identical to condition (12). This is due to the fact that in state s1 = 1
threshold contracts are without effect.
We next consider the case s1 = 0. In this state, voters prefer the unpopular action,
while the politician prefers the popular action. The dissonant politician will only under-
take the optimal action if
R+µ(dR+d2R) ¸ R+G
, dRµ(1+d) ¸ G: (39)
Comparisonwiththeconditioninthescenariowithoutthresholdincentivecontractsshows
that in the case of s1 = 0 it is easier to fulﬁll condition (39) than to fulﬁll condition (13).
In particular, the expression µ(1+d) is positive. Thus it is always possible to fulﬁll equa-
tion (39) by choosing a high enough value of R. This contrasts with the scenario without
contracts, where it is impossible for many values of d and µ to motivate the politician to
undertake the socially optimal action.
We continue our analysis with congruent politicians. In the case s1 = 1, we have the
following condition for a congruent politician to undertake the optimal action:
R+G+dR+d2R ¸ R: (40)
This condition is always fulﬁlled. In the case of s1 = 0, a congruent politician will under-
take the optimal action if
R+G+µ(dR+d2R) ¸ R: (41)
Again, this condition is always fulﬁlled. Hence in both states of the world, the politician
will always pursue the policy optimal for the voters if he has offered a threshold contract.
As we showed above in equation (15), this is not necessarily true for congruent politicians
in the scenario without threshold contracts.
Proof of Proposition 7
Case (i): We start our considerations with two congruent politicians and want to establish
whether ˆ pi = p¤
u is a unique Nash equilibrium. We look at the utility calculations of
politician 1 and analyze whether he wants to deviate from ˆ p1 = p¤
u, given that ˆ p2 = p¤
u. If
he offers ˆ p1 < p¤
u, then he will deﬁnitely not be elected. Thus he will offer ˆ p1 ¸ p¤
u. If
he offers ˆ p1 > p¤
u, then he will be elected with certainty, but he will never get reelected as
33it is not possible to fulﬁll this contract. If he offers ˆ p1 = p¤
u, then he will be elected with
a probability of 1
2. Candidate 1 has to compare his expected utility under both proposals
in order to offer the threshold contract that maximizes his expected utility. The necessary
condition for not deviating from ˆ p1 = p¤
u to ˆ p1 > p¤
u is given by
EUcP
³









Note that a congruent politician will always behave congruently in both states of the world
if he has offered ˆ p1 = p¤
u or ˆ p1 > p¤




, Rf[z+µ(1¡z)](d+d2)¡1g ¸ G: (43)
If ˆ p2 = p¤
u and (43) is fulﬁlled, then candidate 1 will offer ˆ p1 = p¤
u. If ˆ p2 = p¤
u and (43)
is not fulﬁlled, then candidate 1 will offer ˆ p1 > p¤
u. However, politician 1 would always
behave congruently.
No politician has an incentive to deviate to ˆ pi < p¤
u, as he would be outbidded by
his opponent. Furthermore, if (43) is not fulﬁlled, then both candidates will offer ˆ pi = 1.
No politician would have an incentive to deviate from ˆ pi = 1, since his election chances
would be 0 in the case of deviation. This overpromising case ˆ pi = 1 can only be avoided
if (43) is fulﬁlled.23 Hence we have a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where
both politicians offer ˆ pi = p¤
u when (43) is fulﬁlled and ˆ pi = 1 otherwise.
Case (ii): Now we assume that both politicians are dissonant and want to establish
when ˆ pi = p¤
u is a unique Nash equilibrium. We analyze whether candidate 1 deviates
from ˆ p1 = p¤
u to ˆ p1 > p¤
u, given that ˆ p2 = p¤
u. The necessary condition for not deviating
is EUdP
³





ˆ p1j ˆ p1 > p¤
u
´
. Note that a dissonant politician will
never behave congruently when he offers ˆ pi > p¤
u. When he offers ˆ pi = p¤
u and behaves
dissonantly, he has a utility of 1
2(R+G), while he has a utility of R+G when he offers
ˆ pi > p¤
u and behaves dissonantly. Therefore it is not optimal to offer ˆ pi = p¤
u and to behave
dissonantly in both states of the world. Thus politician 1 has to compare the expected
utilities of three possible strategies, which we will denote in the following by c, d, and g :
² Strategy c: Offering ˆ p1 = p¤
u and behaving congruently in s1 = 1 and s1 = 0.
² Strategy d: Offering ˆ p1 > p¤
u and behaving dissonantly in s1 = 1 and s1 = 0.
² Strategy g: Offering ˆ p1 = p¤
u and behaving congruently in s1 = 1 and dissonantly in
s1 = 0.
Candidate 1 will offer ˆ p1 = p¤
u if either EUc ¸ EUd or if EUg ¸ EUd. The condition
EUc ¸ EUd gives us the following inequality:
1
2
Rf[z+µ(1¡z)](d+d2)¡1g ¸ G (44)
23The politicians do not know the offer made by their opponent when they make their own proposal.
Nevertheless, they knowwhether condition (43) is fulﬁlled, so they also know what their opponent’s optimal
offer would be.







[z(d+d2)¡1] ¸ G: (45)
If ˆ p2 = p¤
u and (44) or (45) is fulﬁlled, then candidate 1 will offer ˆ p1 = p¤
u. In
the following we analyze which action will actually be chosen by the incumbent. As he
knows the state of the world at the date when he has to choose his action, his behavior may
deviate from the behavior he used to calculate the expected utilities of the three strategies.
Actual behavior depends on the state of the world. According to equation (38) he will











condition (38) is always fulﬁlled in the case where the politician offers ˆ p1 = p¤
u. In
state s1 = 0 the incumbent will only behave congruently if condition (39) is fulﬁlled,






, the behavior of the politician
can be either congruent or dissonant, depending on whether condition (39) is fulﬁlled.
If neither condition (44) nor condition (45) is fulﬁlled, then both candidates will
offer ˆ pi = 1 and will behave dissonantly. No politician would have an incentive to deviate
from ˆ pi = 1, since his election chances would then be 0. Thus we have a unique Nash
equilibrium, where both dissonant politicians offer ˆ pi = p¤
u when (44) or (45) is fulﬁlled
and ˆ pi = 1 otherwise.
Case (iii): We know that a dissonant politician will deviate to ˆ pi = 1 if neither condi-
tion (44) nor condition (45) is fulﬁlled. If one politician offers ˆ pi = 1, then his opponent
will also offer ˆ pi = 1, irrespective of his type. Since the candidates know the type of their
opponent, both politicians will offer ˆ pi = 1 if both (44) and (44) are violated, no matter
whether condition (43) for the congruent politician is fulﬁlled or not. The candidates will
only offer ˆ pi = p¤
u if either inequality (44) or inequality (45) is fulﬁlled.










price is a wealth- and conﬁdence-weighted average belief on the part of the investors, it
is not possible for the market price to exceed 1
2 if each single investor has a belief that is
smallerthan 1
2 andviceversa. Byusing RES, votersare abletoavoidgivingthepoliticians
an incentive for overpromising. As there is no overpromising problem in this case, the
absolute values of ˆ pi do not matter. It is only important if ˆ pi is ¸ 1
2 or < 1
2. Furthermore,
we note that under RES a politician (say i = 2) who offers a contract with a price smaller
35than 1
2 will never generate a higher utility than a politician who offers a price equal to or
larger than 1
2. Thus electing politician 1 can never be worse than electing politician 2 in
this case.
Both politicians will offer Ci( ˆ pi = 1
2). Given that candidate 2 offers C2( ˆ pi = 1
2),
politician 1 will not deviate to ˆ pi < 1
2, since then he has no chance of winning the election.
Furthermore, he will not deviate to ˆ pi > 1
2, since this does not increase his chances of
winning the election while his threshold contract gets more demanding. Thus he will
offerC1( ˆ p1) = 1
2.
Proof of Proposition 9
Case (i) Retrospective Reelection Scheme
We start with a congruent politician. It is obvious that he will act congruently in state
s1 = 1, because if he behaved dissonantly then he would have a lower utility in the ﬁrst
period, his reelection chances after the ﬁrst period would be lower, and he would be
deselected with certainty after his second term in ofﬁce.
The analysis is more difﬁcult in the case of s1 = 0. First we look at the scenario
without threshold contracts. It is obvious that a congruent politician will always behave
congruently for t ¸ 2 irrespective of the state of the world, as a politician who acts con-
gruently has additional utility G and will be reelected with certainty in the next period
according to rR
t (at¡1;st¡1jat¡1 = st¡1) = 1, while he will be deselected with certainty if
he undertakes the wrong action. Even a politician who behaved dissonantly in the ﬁrst
period will act congruently in the second period and will be deselected afterwards. The
only remaining question is the behavior of the politician in the ﬁrst period. A congruent
politician will act congruently in the ﬁrst period (and in all following periods) if
R+G+µ[d(R+G)+:::+dT¡3(R+G)+dT¡2R+dT¡1R] ¸ R+(1¡µ)d(R+G) ;







dk > (1¡µ)d(R+G): (46)
In the scenario with threshold contracts and s1 = 0, a congruent politician will act
congruently in the ﬁrst period if
R+G+µ[d(R+G)+:::+dT¡3(R+G)+dT¡2R+dT¡1R] ¸ R: (47)
This condition is always fulﬁlled. Hence under the triple mechanism the politician acts
congruently in the ﬁrst period and, as we showed above, in all subsequent periods as well.
We can summarize our results as follows:
36(a) If s1 = 1, then a congruent politician will behave congruently in each period and
will always be reelected. This holds both with and without threshold contracts.
(b) If s1 = 0 and there are no threshold contracts, then a congruent politician will only
behavecongruentlyineachperiodifcondition(46)isfulﬁlled. Otherwisethepoliti-
cian will behave dissonantly in the ﬁrst period, congruently in the second period,
and be deselected afterwards.
(g) If s1 = 0 and there are threshold contracts, then a congruent politician will behave
congruently in each period and will always be reelected.
We continue our analysis with a dissonant politician. The procedure is similar to the
case of a congruent politician and is therefore omitted here. However, note that it is no
longer clear that the incumbent will behave congruently for t ¸ 2. Thus we obtain the
following results:
(a1) If the triple mechanism is not introduced, then a dissonant politician will act con-










in state s1 = 0 is fulﬁlled. Otherwise the politician will behave dissonantly in the
ﬁrst and second period and be rejected at the end of his second term in ofﬁce.
(a2) If the triple mechanism is not introduced, then a dissonant politician will act con-





Otherwise the politician will behave dissonantly in periodt andt+1 and be rejected
afterwards.
(b1) If there are threshold incentive contracts, then a dissonant politician will behave










in the state s1 = 0 is fulﬁlled. Otherwise the politician will behave dissonantly in
the ﬁrst period and will not be allowed to stand for reelection in the second period.
37(b2) If there are threshold incentive contracts, then a dissonant politician will behave





Thus we have shown that under the retrospective voting scheme the conditions under
which politicians behave congruently with threshold contracts are less strict than they
would be without thresholds. This holds for both types of politicians and for both states.
Case(ii) Popularity Reelection Scheme





















is fulﬁlled, then it will be better for a congruent politician to behave congruently in period
t and in each subsequent period than to behave dissonantly in period t and always behave
congruently afterwards. Note that the term [z+µ(1¡z)] denotes the expected reelection














is fulﬁlled, then it will be better for a congruent politician to behave congruently than
to behave dissonantly in period t and in all subsequent periods. As the right-hand side
of condition (48) is larger than the right-hand side of condition (49), the politician uses
condition (48) to calculate his optimal behavior. The politician has to undertake this
calculation in each period, and if condition (48) is fulﬁlled, then the politician will behave
congruently.











is always fulﬁlled. When state st = 0 occurs for the ﬁrst time, the politician will only act
congruently if condition (48) is satisﬁed.
38In the scenario with elections and threshold contracts, the politician will always be-






















in the case of st = 0 is always fulﬁlled.
We can summarize our results as follows:
(a) In the scenario without threshold contracts, a congruent politician will behave con-











If condition (53) is violated, then he will behave congruently in state st = 1 and
dissonantly in state st = 0. The politician will be deselected if he acts congruently
in state st = 0 and the voters are not able to observe this state in period t, or if he
acts dissonantly in state st = 0 and the voters are able to observe this state in period
t.
(b) In the scenario with threshold contracts, a congruent politician will always behave
congruently in both states of the world.
We continue our analysis with a dissonant politician. The procedure is similar to
the case of a congruent politician and is therefore omitted here. We obtain the following
results:
(a) If there are no threshold contracts, then a dissonant politician will act dissonantly
in state st = 0 because of our assumption that µ < 1
2. In state st = 1 he will act
congruently in period t if




dkR(z+µ(1¡z))k¡1] ¸ G (54)
or if







dkG((1¡µ)(1¡z))k¡1] ¸ G (55)
39The politician will be deselected if he acts congruently in state st = 0 and the voters
are not able to observe this state in period t or if he acts dissonantly in state st = 0
and the voters are able to observe this state in period t.
(b) If there are threshold contracts, then a dissonant politician will act congruently in




dkR(z2+(1¡z)2)k¡1] ¸ G (56)




dkR(z2+(1¡z)2)k¡1] ¸ G: (57)
If condition (56) or condition (57), respectively, is violated, then the politician will
act dissonantly in period t and will not be allowed to stand for reelection afterwards
because of the threshold contract.
Thus we have shown that under popularity voting the conditions under which politi-
cians behave congruently with threshold contracts are less strict than they would be with-
out thresholds in state st = 0, while threshold contracts have no effect in state st = 1.
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